Israeli and American officials expressed a great deal of concern over Iranian and Syrian assistance to Lebanese Hizbullah during its Summer 2006 war with Israel. There were not only allegations that Tehran was supplying Hizbullah -which the US government classifies as a foreign terrorist organization -with weapons and other military supplies, there also were claims that Iranian personnel were fighting on Hizbullah's behalf. There were even accusations that Tehran directed Hizbullah to act in order to distract attention from its suspicious nuclear program. There was little publicly available evidence to support such allegations: Hizbullah denied that it was acting on any but its own behalf, and Tehran and Damascus also rejected the accusations.
However, the accusations persisted after the war. A top US State Department official testified before Congress in April 2007: "Hizbullah and its allies, with support from Syria and Iran, have mounted a growing campaign to overthrow Lebanon's legitimate, elected Government."
1 The official went on to say that this campaign has "effectively paralyzed the Lebanese Government and is further eroding the Lebanese economy." In an apparent reference to the bloody civil war that began in 1975 and continued for some 15 years, he warned of "growing concerns about a return of civil conflict."
Many Lebanese political figures have voiced similar concerns over the years, but Hizbullah consistently has denied that it is an instrument of Iranian or Syrian policy. Indeed, categorization of Hizbullah is not straightforward -in its two-and-a-half decade existence Hizbullah has gone from being a marginalized group of radicals to having members serve in the cabinet and the legislature, while simultaneously maintaining an armed militia. Yet Hizbullah could not have reached its current level of significance without the support of Iran and Syria, and the July 2007 meeting in Damascus between Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and Hizbullah Secretary General Hassan Nas-
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Another influential cleric was Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, who was born in the holy Iraqi city of Najaf in 1935 and moved to Lebanon, where his family originated, in 1966. He preached, and also established schools and orphanages, throughout Lebanon. Fadlallah was involved with the development of Hizbullah's ideology and his views continue be similar to those of the organization, but he consistently denies formal involvement with the organization. 5 Despite the efforts of these individuals, Shi'a political activism was fairly limited when the Lebanese Civil War began in the late 1970s. It was at this time that Israel first invaded Lebanon, although many cross-border incursions had taken place already. Israeli forces invaded in 1978 and again in 1982. The 1982 invasion displaced thousands of Lebanese Shi'a and led to the deaths of thousands of others. Many of those who fled southern Lebanon ended up in Palestinian refugee camps or in urban slums. Events during the civil war radicalized the Lebanese Shi'a.
Although it took place hundreds of miles away, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran had an impact on Lebanon. Some of the Iranian revolutionaries had undergone training in Lebanon in the late 1960s and in the 1970s; members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon conducted much of the training, but connections with Amal also existed. Lebanese clerics, furthermore, had studied in Najaf and Qom with Iranian counterparts who would later be involved with the revolution.
The revolutionary leader in Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, had made his sympathies known as well. In a February 1978 speech he complained that the US and UK created Israel as a means of harming the Shi'a and had reduced Lebanon to "its present miserable state. 
iran's Centrality in HizbullaH ideology
Military activities were just one aspect of Iranian involvement in Lebanon, but early efforts to advance Ayatollah Khomeini's religio-political views through contacts with Amal had not borne fruit. Meanwhile, splits among Lebanese Shi'a had emerged, after the political leadership of Amal, represented by Nabih Berri, and the more religious members of the organization -some of whom would go on to leadership positions in Hizbullah -disagreed on how to fight Israel and on the necessity of alliances with Maronite Christians. Some of the Iranian personnel who remained in Lebanon The letter cites Khomeini's view that "America is the reason for all our catastrophes and source of all malice." The letter identifies France, Maronite Christians, the Phalange, Israel, and Arab states that cooperate with Israel as its other enemies. In terminology reminiscent of Khomeini's, the letter describes the conclusion of Israel's occupation of Lebanon as a "prelude to its final obliteration from existence," describes Israel as "the ulcerous growth of world Zionism," and adds, "our confrontation of this entity must end with its obliteration from existence." The letter also condemns Arab regimes siding with President Saddam Husayn's Iraq in its war against Iran.
The letter bore a "distinctive made-in-Tehran coloration," a noted scholar of Lebanese affairs writes, and "is reliably reported to have been written by an Iranian who is today [in 2000] very much in the pro-Khatami reform movement."
19 The "inextricable link" between Vilayat-i Faqih, the Iranian state, and the Islamic revolution "consecrate" the relationship between Hizbullah and Iran, another scholar asserts.
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Iranian officials' participation in the key decision-making bodies of Hizbullah contributed to this closeness. Hizbullah's 17-member Majlis al-Shura, which was created by Iran's Ayatollah Fazlollah Mahallati -a top figure in the IRGC contingent -and which did not hold regular meetings until May 1986, included "one or two" IRGC representatives or officials from the Iranian embassies in Beirut or Damascus.
21
The Majlis al-Shura continues to include at least one IRGC official.
Moreover, the council's membership included Hizbullah figures with close ties to the Iranian clergy. Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah, for example, was a student of Khomeini's.
22 Nasrallah and Shaykh Sobhi Tufayli, both of whom would serve later as Hizbullah's Secretary-General, were close to Mohtashami-Pur, the Iranian Ambassador in Damascus, whereas the Iranian rubbed Fadlallah the wrong way. provision of supplies to Hizbullah. Moreover, Syrian forces' occupation of Lebanon could be traced to June 1976, when Lebanon's then-President Suleiman Frangieh invited them to enter the country to enforce a cease-fire in the civil war. Finally, Damascus saw Lebanon as part of a Greater Syria (bilad al-Sham) that included Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Territories. Syria's status allowed it to constrain the activities of its partners.
According to Hizbullah Deputy Secretary-General Shaykh Na'im Qassem: "It is only natural that Hizbullah's views concur with those of Syria, for no one is safe from Israel's ambitions." 24 He goes on to say that Hizbullah's relationship with Damascus is not "mandatory or accidental," rather it is based on regional realities -including close Tehran-Damascus relations -and has "so far proven its utility and necessity." 34 Ta'if also brought about an amended Lebanese National Accord (which serves as the country's constitution) that took into consideration the growth in size and influence of the Shi'a population, although it called for the disarming of all militias.
In the ensuing years, Syria used Hizbullah as a proxy force through formal and informal rules it negotiated with Israel. 35 Syria's objective was to reduce the risk to its own forces when Hizbullah acted against the Israelis in southern Lebanon. 
LEbaNONIzaTION -HIzbuLLaH JOINS THE MaINSTREaM
The 1989 Ta'if Accords coincided with a debate within Hizbullah over its objectives and the desirability of turning Lebanon into an Islamic state. These events came on the heels of Ayatollah Khomeini's death in June and the resulting debate among Iranian leaders over the desirability of a more pragmatic foreign policy course.
It was only after an "extraordinary conclave" in Tehran in October 1989 that Hizbullah decided to go along with the multi-confessional system described in the accords. 38 At this conclave a more radical faction called for increased party discipline and advocated "perpetual" jihad against opponents of an Islamic Lebanon (this group was connected with Iran's 'Ali Akbar Mohtashami-Pur and controlled the Western hostages in Lebanon). 39 The faction that came out on top, however, advocated integration with the multi-confessional system, a position allegedly shared by Iran's President 'Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Shaykh Fadlallah. 40 Hizbullah, therefore, opted to seek the status of a legal party that would "support the resistance in the south and seek to abolish all forms of political sectarianism in Lebanon." 41 
publiC serviCes and reConstruCtion
The Lebanese government's inability to provide adequate public services during the civil war led citizens to turn to the local militias, such as the Christian Lebanese Forces and the Druze Socialist and Progressive Party (PSP). In the Shi'a community, Imam Musa Sadr had focused on public needs as early as the 1960s, and clerics throughout the country were running orphanages and performing other philanthropic acts. Iran began to aid these organizations in the early 1980s, and a network emerged as they adopted the Hizbullah name. 48 In some cases, the NGOs are branches of ones based in Iran, reporting to Iran and adopting policies dictated from Iran.
partiCipating in eleCtions
The other aspect of Hizbullah's "Lebanonization" entailed participation in elections. This was not a smooth process, however, as Shaykh Sobhi Tufayli headed a minority opposing participation on the grounds that it would lead to cooptation and the loss of ideals. 49 Nevertheless, competing in the August-September 1992 legislative race paid off for Hizbullah, and in a grudging alliance with Amal and the PSP, eight Hizbullah members were elected to the 128-seat legislature.
Damascus influenced Hizbullah's role in the 1996 elections. Amal's Nabih Berri had tried to impose candidates on Hizbullah and also limit the number of seats available to it. Hassan Nasrallah responded by announcing at a rally that the party would field independent candidates to run in the south. Within a week both Berri and Nasrallah were summoned to Damascus, and a day later Hizbullah radio announced that Hizbullah and Amal would run a joint list for the south and for the Biqa' Valley. 50 The outcome of the elections saw a reduction in the total number of legislators affiliated with or supportive of Hizbullah.
Hizbullah next fielded candidates in the 1998 municipal elections, the first to take place in 35 years. Hizbullah fared well in the predominantly Shi'a parts of the country due to well-organized campaigning and the creation of alliances with other political organizations. 51 Hizbullah hoped to translate the May 2000 Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon into success at parliamentary polls in August-September of that year. It would appear that the Iranian government shared this sentiment -Hassan Nasrallah visited the Iranian capital in July 2000, and Amal's Nabih Berri arrived in early August. The timing suggested that Tehran was trying to heal rifts between the two groups before the elections, hoping that the role of a unifier would give Iran greater influence over Lebanese affairs. At the end of July, Berri announced that Hizbullah must participate in the next government. 53 In a back-room deal, Hizbullah backed Rafiq Hariri in Beirut, rather than the Syrian favorite, Selim al-Hoss. 54 Nevertheless, Hizbullah gained at least two more legislative seats, and the Hizbullah/Amal ticket won 23 seats.
a DYNaMIC NEW CENTuRY
The Israeli withdrawal in May 2000 and the parliamentary elections later that year were not the only events that affected the relationship among Hizbullah, Iran, and Syria. Other events in the first decade of the new millennium also had a profound impact on the region and changed the balance of the relationship. These would include the death of President Hafiz al-Asad, who had ruled Syria for 30 years, the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States and the subsequent Global War on Terror, and Lebanon's Cedar Revolution.
teHran takes CHarge
The death of President Hafiz al-Asad on June 10, 2000 could have seriously disrupted the relationship among Syria, Iran, and Hizbullah, but all three sides worked hard to ensure continuity. Asad prepared the grounds for his son Bashar beforehand by introducing him to his future interlocutors. In 1999, for example, Bashar met with Has- san Nasrallah at least three times (in January, May, and November), President Emile Lahud twice (in February and November), Nabih Berri in May, and President Muhammad Khatami in May. Afterwards, Khatami attended the funeral in Damascus, and in a meeting with the new president expressed the hope that Bashar "would proceed with his father's policy line." 55 Khatami assured Bashar that the Iranian government and people would stand by and support him.
In fact, Syria's new leader ending up giving ground to the Iranians and to Hizbullah, whose confidence had been greatly bolstered by the Israeli withdrawal. Just a month after the change of leadership in Damascus, Hassan Nasrallah was in Tehran, and he said after meeting Khatami:
Our views are completely identical on the continuation of the Resistance and the need for weapons to remain in the hands of Hizbullah or in the hands of the remaining parties as part of the broad resistance, because Israel will remain a threat to Lebanon's security and stability. 56 Nasrallah added:
The Resistance will continue and we will remain in our positions even after the completion of the withdrawal because a new file will be opened, which is the file of Palestine and holy Jerusalem, which concerns the entire Islamic world.
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Supreme Leader Khamene'i expressed similar views when he met with Nasrallah, describing the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon as "the first stage of struggle against Zionism" and advising Hizbullah to "maintain its vigilance to pass the next stages to achieve the final victory over the Zionist enemy." 58 Later that month, a special envoy for the Supreme Leader traveled to Beirut to meet with Nasrallah and Fadlallah. The envoy advised, "Jihad against the Israeli enemy is the only way for lifting the injustice and ending the occupation of Palestine." 60 On the same day in Beirut, Nasrallah said that Hizbullah would not disarm and suggested that Hizbullah would continue its operations even if Israeli forces withdrew from the Sheb'a Farms. 61 The timing of these statements probably was not a coincidence. 62 Hassan Nasrallah and other Hizbullah officials attended this event, as did representatives of Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. Anonymous Iranian sources claimed that a Hizbullah-Hamas reconciliation would take place on the sidelines of the conference, and unnamed "top sources" in Hamas and Hizbullah said the Iranian government wanted reconciliation so the two organizations could focus on fighting Israel. 63 Later that year, a Beirut journalist wrote that a pro-Iranian wing in Hizbullah would like hostilities against Israel to continue, whereas the pro-Syrian wing was advocating restraint. 64 Syrian calls for restraint related to a fear of being targetted as a state sponsor of terror by the US military after 9/11. As a result, Hizbullah did not inform Syria of at least two pending attacks against the Israelis in the Sheb'a Farms. An anonymous source told the journalist that Hizbullah worried that Damascus would betray it in exchange for security from a US attack.
tHe global war on terror
The al-Qa'ida attack against the United States in September 2001 had a profound, albeit short-lived, impact on Tehran. President Muhammad Khatami expressed his condolences on the same day the attacks occurred, and for two weeks the "Death to America" chant was not heard at the congregational Friday prayers, which are broadcast nationally. Iranian officials reportedly played helpful roles in the actual conflict against the Taliban and in talks in Bonn on post-conflict Afghanistan, even though Supreme Leader Khamene'i publicly denounced the US and dismissed the possibility of Iranian cooperation against the Taliban and al-Qa'ida.
Iranian cooperation at the time most likely resulted from a fear of the United States and recognition that being viewed by Washington as the leading state sponsor of terrorism could have dire consequences for the regime. However, the level of cooperation had its limits. In January 2002 the Israeli navy seized the Karine A, a ship carrying rockets, mines, explosives, anti-tank missiles, rifles, and ammunition. These supplies allegedly were bound for the Palestinian Authority rather than one of the groups with which Iran is usually identified, but many of the weapons were of Iranian origin and the vessel's last stop was on Kish Island in the Persian Gulf. Further hindering hopes for improvements in Tehran-Washington relations was President George W. Bush's January 2002 State of the Union address, in which he said Iran, as well as Iraq, North Korea, and their terrorist allies, "constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world."
Curiously, the White House expected that Tehran would be responsive to its April 2002 request to rein in Hizbullah's military activities. Yet at an April 11 press conference, which took place after his meeting with Hassan Nasrallah, Foreign Minister 62. These events were covered by IRNA, as well as state radio and television. Kamal Kharrazi called for continued resistance against Israel and condemned the US. 65 Kharrazi also called for "care and self-restraint in order to prevent the Zionist regime from causing intrigue in the region," which led a reporter to ask if this applies to "resistance operations at the Shaaba Farms." Kharrazi explained: "The call for self-restraint in my previous statements refers to the Israeli provocation. This is because Israel is the party that seeks to expand the circle of war and seeks provocation in this regard. The Lebanese resistance in the rest of the occupied Lebanese areas is considered a legitimate right for Lebanon." In late April, furthermore, the head of the Iranian Supreme Leader's office told a gathering in Damascus about the importance of jihad as exemplified by Hizbullah, and he added that Iranian policy is to "strengthen and support the front line of resistance against the Zionist regime." 66 killing a leader and ending an oCCupation On September 2, 2004 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1559, which called on foreign forces to leave Lebanon and cease their interference in the country's affairs, and also called for the disarmament of the country's militias. "Foreign forces" referred to Syrian troops that had occupied the country for some two decades, and "militias" referred mainly to Hizbullah, although smaller armed groups, mainly Palestinians, did exist. Damascus moved quickly to protect its position by extending the presidential term of ally Emile Lahud, elected in 1998 to what is normally a one-time, six-year term. By depending on its allies and by using coercion, Syria persuaded the Lebanese legislature to extend Lahud's term by three years on September 4.
Some legislators and cabinet members resigned in protest over the extension, and one of them, Marwan Hamade, became the target of a near-fatal October 1 car bomb. Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was urged to resign because he objected to the extension, and he left office in October. The Iranian government and Hizbullah, however, saw the extension as a favorable development: President Khatami telephoned his congratulations to Lahud, and a delegation of top Hizbullah officials visited Lahud to convey Nasrallah's congratulations. 67 Khatami also voiced support for Syria during an October visit to Damascus, saying that Syria, Iran, and Lebanon are coordinating their activities to withstand pressure from the US and Israel. 68 Later that month, an Iranian presidential adviser met with Nasrallah, his deputy Na'im Qassem, and Lahud in Beirut and vowed that Iran always has and always will support "the Lebanese people and their resistance." 
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emerged what came to be known as the "independence intifada," referred to as a "Cedar Revolution" by the White House to equate it with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia. 71 Hariri's death barely elicited a mention from Damascus, and Syrian state-controlled media blamed Israel. 72 Hojatoleslam 'Ali Akbar Mohtashami-Pur, Iran's former ambassador to Syria, pinned the blame on al-Qa'ida acting on behalf of the US, with the objective of starting a civil war that could be blamed on Syria. 73 Regardless, Mohtashami-Pur and two Iranian vice-presidents attended Hariri's funeral.
The international pressure on Syria picked up, prompting Iran to show its solidarity. When Syrian Prime Minister Muhammad Naji al-Utri visited Tehran on February 16 and 17, cooperation guarantees were provided. Supreme National Security Council Secretary Hojatoleslam Hassan Rohani emphasized that Lebanon-Syria relations are not the problem; rather, the problems are the Israeli occupation of the Sheb'a Farms, the Lebanese civil war, and Israeli hostility. 74 Hizbullah responded to the domestic opposition with a March 8 rally in Beirut that attracted hundreds of thousands, making it the largest in the country's history. 75 Nasrallah told the crowd that Lebanon and Syria are inextricably bound: "No one can get Syria out of Lebanon or out of Lebanon's mind, heart, and future."
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After the March 8 rally in Beirut, the Friday Prayer sermon in Iran, dictated by the Supreme Leader's Office through the Central Council of Friday Prayer Leaders, also emphasized support for Hizbullah. In Tehran, for example, the preacher claimed that the US and Israel killed Hariri in order to force a Syrian withdrawal and weaken Hizbullah. 77 He went on to hail the March 8 rally and tell the US and Israel, "This is the awake Lebanon that you see before you."
Hizbullah's pro-Syrian rallies did not cow the Lebanese opposition, however, and it organized a counter-rally on March 14 in which approximately one million people -including Sunnis, Druze, and Christians -participated. 78 Events such as this compounded with the international pressure were too much for Damascus, which also was being criticized by the US for permitting Islamist combatants to enter Iraq. President Asad first announced in early February that Syrian troops would withdraw from the capital to the Biqa' Valley, as required by the 1989 Ta'if Accords, and in March, United Nations envoy Terje Roed-Larsen received a promise of a complete withdrawal by the end of April. 79 In what could be seen as a show of support, Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi made two trips to Syria in April, warning that the "political vacuum" in Lebanon is not in the country's or the region's interest and adding that Israel seeks to take advantage of the situation. 80 Nevertheless, the last Syrian troops had withdrawn by the end of the month, ending the most obvious manifestation of Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs. The extent of Iranian and Syrian involvement in Hizbullah activities and ideology, however, precluded a clean break.
eleCtoral impaCt of tHe Cedar revolution
Lebanon's May-June 2005 parliamentary elections were the first to take place after the Syrian withdrawal and were therefore relatively free. Consequently, a number of Syrian allies decided against running because they recognized the likelihood of defeat.
Tehran sought to ensure a desirable electoral outcome by meeting with Lebanese opposition figures such as Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader of the PSP. Jumblatt traveled to Tehran in late April, and in a meeting with President Khatami they agreed on "the danger of any new U.S. attempt to target the countries in the region under the banner of democratic change and devised chaos." 81 Jumblatt also defended Iran's involvement with Hizbullah, asking rhetorically, "Is there any liberation movement in history that has not received support from abroad?" 82 He continued:
I believe that the aim of some colonialist circles will remain to destabilize the Islamic Republic and to strike at the gains of the regime in Iran. Naturally, the purpose is to prevent Iran from supporting liberation movements such as Hizbullah in Lebanon.
Hizbullah went farther than before in creating electoral alliances. Hizbullah candidates were on the same list as Sa'd Hariri in Beirut, as Jumblatt in the eastern Aley-Baabda region, and as the Maronite Michel Aoun's candidates in Kesrouan-Jbeil and Zahleh in the north. 83 The alliance building paid off at the polls. The Resistance and Development Bloc, which consisted of Hizbullah, Amal, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, won 35 out of 128 seats. It earned 80% of the votes in South Lebanon when the second round of voting took place, and slightly less than 50% of the seats in the Biqa' Valley.
At this point it is useful to reflect on Hizbullah's growing enthusiasm for elections. One Lebanese scholar argues that Hizbullah accepts democracy as a political system, but in terms of "intellectual thought," it accepts only the Islamic state. 84 Its participation in elections reflects not just the political reality forced on it by Syrian dominance and Iranian influence, then, but acceptance that democracy is "the next best system to Islam." 85 Hizbullah would impose Islamic rule only if a sizable portion of the population wanted this, the scholar believes, and it would overturn the democratic system only if it had a significant parliamentary majority. 86 
ConneCting witH new iranian leaders
The next possible stumbling block in the relationship among Hizbullah, Iran, and Syria was the June 2005 election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad as the Islamic republic's president. The three actors did not waste much time in conveying an image of continuity.
Hizbullah and Damascus acted first. Hassan Nasrallah arrived in Tehran on July 31, before Ahmadinejad's inauguration. A Lebanese newspaper described this as reflecting his desire to compensate for the recently departed Syrians and to coordinate activities with the new Iranian leadership. 87 Some Hizbullah leaders are very happy with the outcome of the election, the daily continued: they believe "the new Iranian leadership [will] be more flexible and more forthcoming in supporting the party's strategy," and will take "a hard-line stance when it comes to the subject of Hizbullah since it considers this party a vital political and security arm for the Islamic regime in Iran." Bashar Asad arrived in Tehran on August 7, and Ahmadinejad made a highly publicized visit to Syria in late January 2006.
Five months later, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1680. The resolution reiterated many of the points in Resolution 1559, such as respect for borders, restricting the transit of arms to militias, and "further efforts to disband and disarm all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias." It may have been a coincidence that Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki was in Damascus at the time, but he reacted predictably, saying Resolution 1680 was against international law and represented foreign interference in bilateral Damascus-Beirut relations. 88 The same day, Mottaki met with Hizbullah's Nasrallah and Hamas Political Bureau chief Khalid Mish'al. 89 subsequent press conference, the two discussed Iran's support for "the Lebanese resistance," and Muhammad-Najjar said, "We shall continue to support the resistance, and the people of Palestine."
tHe HizbullaH-israel war of 2006
It was just a short time later -on July 12, 2006 -that Hizbullah initiated a war with Israel by kidnapping two of its soldiers and killing another eight in a cross-border raid. The conflict lasted almost six weeks, and Israel and the US alleged that Iran and Syria were involved. An Iranian C802 shore-to-ship missile that allegedly was operated by Iranians struck an Israeli navy vessel off the Lebanese coast on July 15. The US State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism asserted that Iranian combatants were involved directly in the conflict. 92 He referred to Iran as "the paymaster" who spent "hundreds of millions of dollars" on arms and other forms of support for Hizbullah, and added that Iran is "clearly directing a lot of Hizbullah actions." "Hizbullah asks their permission to do things," he continued, "especially if it has broader international implications."
Iranian and Syrian officials' movements and statements at the time contributed to such suspicions. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani was in Damascus on the day the war began. 93 Five days later, Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki arrived in Damascus, where he and Syrian Vice President Faruq al-Shara condemned Israel and expressed solidarity with the "resistance." 94 Just a fortnight after his previous visit, Larijani returned to Damascus, allegedly to meet with Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. 95 Aside from the accusations and denials of Iranian involvement, Tehran seemed satisfied. Supreme Leader Khamene'i said events in Lebanon prove that "the presence of the Zionists in the region is a satanic and cancerous presence and an infected tumor for the entire world of Islam." 96 Iranian Friday prayer leaders' sermons were similarly supportive. In the southern city of Ahvaz, for example, the preacher said Hizbullah has "smashed the myth of [Israeli] invincibility" and described Hizbullah's actions as "a source of pride for the world of Islam." 97 Four of the top Shi'a clerics in Iran said they would allocate a percentage of their tithes to Hizbullah. 98 Iran gave a lukewarm welcome to UN Resolution 1701 of August 11, 2006, which concluded the conflict. The Foreign Ministry spokesman said Iran was "happy" that the resolution was passed and criticized its failure to condemn alleged Israeli "crimes." 99 walkout in late 2006. It can be argued reasonably that the walkout reflected Hizbullah's political ambitions, and it did not serve the short or medium-term interests of either the Iranian or Syrian regimes. As sectarian clashes took place in Lebanon in early 2007, furthermore, Iranian and Syrian officials exchanged visits and discussed the need to avoid Shi'a-Sunni strife. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani visited Damascus on January 21 -a trip unnamed Iranian sources described as an effort to avoid "falling into the American trap by inciting sectarian seditions among Sunnis and Shiites in the region." 103 Syria's Foreign Minister Walid Mualem visited Tehran the next day, and President Asad came in mid-February -the official Iran newspaper predicted the two sides would "adopt a new approach" to the Lebanese conflict.
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The new approach predicted by the official daily was not readily apparent. There was speculation in the Lebanese media that a solution to the Lebanese crisis was devised when President Ahmadinejad visited Saudi Arabia in March 2007 . 105 Yet in an interview early the next month, the Iranian ambassador to Syria declared that Tehran backs Hizbullah's position on the make-up of the cabinet -at the time, it promoted a formula in which the 11 opposition members in a 30-member cabinet would have veto power. 106 This suggests that Tehran was unable to change Hizbullah's perspective and therefore accepted it.
In the past, Hizbullah personnel operated overseas in coordination with Iran -witness bombings in Paris (1986), a shooting in Berlin (1992), bombings in Buenos Aires (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) , and a bombing in Al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia (1996) . 107 These events occurred during the period when Hizbullah identified most closely with Iran's revolutionary model and was most dependent on Iranian aid and support. Moreover, Hizbullah's relatively minor stake in the Lebanese political process during those years, as well as the relative insulation from retribution afforded it by the Syrian occupation, meant that it was unlikely to suffer retaliation.
The US military claimed in July 2007 that Iranian leaders directed Hizbullah
